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Themistius on Concept Acquisition 
and Knowledge of Essences 
by Myrna Gabbe (Dayton) 
Abstract: Themistius's (ca. 317- ca. 388 C.E.) paraphrase of the De Anima is an influential 
and important work; however, it is not now regarded as profound or original and thereby 
sutTers from neglect. I argue that Themistius is misunderstood on the matter of Aristotle's 
productive and potential intellects. It is commonly held that Themistius gives to the pro-
~uctive intellect the role of illuminating images in order to produce universal thoughts 
In the potential intellect with epistemic certainty. I argue that Themistius's productive 
intellect does not transform images to reveal the forms contained therein, but gives to the 
potential intellect the ability, first , to organize our sense-experiences in the course of ac-
quiring rudimentary universal concepts and, then, to discover the forms of things by or-
dinary discursive thinking. 
J 
Themistius (ca. 317- ca. 388 C.E.) was once an influential philosopher. His 
paraphrases of Aristotle's treatises were studied from Late Antiquity 
through the Renaissance and translated into Syriac, Arabic, Hebrew and 
Latin . J Arguably, his paraphrase of the De Anima is his most important 
Work, as its influence can be seen in the writings of Averroes and Thomas 
Aquinas. 2 However, this treatise is not now regarded as profound or illumi-
nating and it, thereby, suffers from neglect. 3 
I Extant are his paraphrases on the Posterior Ana/yties, Physics, De Anima, De Caelo 
and Metaphysics /I.; now lost are his exegeses of the Categories, Prior Analytics and 
Topics. See Todd 2003 for a complete survey and history ofThemistius's work. 
2 For Themistius's influence on the Christian and Islamic medieval philosophers, see, 
e. g. , Verbeke 1957, Mahoney 1973, Davidson 1992, and Taylor 2007. 
3 Hamelin 1953,38 f writes: "Apn':s Alexandre, la seule interpretation profonde et orig-
inale de la tMorie de l'intellect [ ... J c'est I' interpretation des Alexandrins. Or on se 
tromperait en la cherchant dans Themistius: on n'en trouverait que des traces. [ ... ] 
Bien qu 'a propos de l' intellect il quitte un moment Ie genre de la paraphrase pour celui 
du commentaire, ses developpements gardent toujours ce caractere Iitteral qui fait de 
lui un interprete utile et sur pour l'intelligence verbale d 'Aristote, rna is pauvre en 
aperyus profonds sur la pensee du maitre. " Blumenthal 1977,253 expresses a simi lar 
sentiment, noting in passing that Themistius is not a profound interpreter of Aristotle. 
And Balleriaux 1994 does not think him astute enough to see the obvious contradic-
tions in his supposed theory of the emotions. Indeed, contemporary scholars are 
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Themistius is in part to blame for the present day reception of this exe-
gesis. He wrote paraphrases, rather than lengthy commentaries to enable 
tho e limited in time to return to a study of Aristotle' works.4 B~t his sum-
mary style gives the impression that his understanding of the text is super-
ficial, and this leads the reader to wonder whether he approached it with a 
ystematic interpretive strategy. The vicw of recent scholar i that he did 
not. On his methodology, Pamela Huby writes: "lIe looks closely at each 
section as he comes to it, and tries to make sense of it by relating it to other 
sections on a elective basis". ]n her view, "we have only a partial account, 
and the parts do not add up to a coherent whole". s But even if Huby's de-
scription were accurate, Themistius's De Animo would still warrant a care-
ful study. It is the earliest surviving commentary on the De AII/II/a; it is a sig-
nificant source for Theophrastus on the intellect; and it influenced the 
thought of medieval and Renaissance philosophers.6 However, I hope to 
show that her assessment is not correct. 
In this essay I argue that Themistius is misunderstood on the matter of 
Aristotle's productive and potential intellects. It is commonly held that 
Themistius gives to the productive intellect the role of illuminating imageS 
in order to produce universal thoughts with epistemic certainty in its poten-
tial counterpart. This problematic theory was once common ly attributed to 
Aristo tle and , though it is not now in favor, is st ill widely attributed to his 
Peripatetic successor. I argue that Themistius's prod uctive intellect does 
not provide insight by transforming images or illuminating forms contained 
therein. It gives to the potential intellect the abi lity, first, to organize our 
sense-experiences in the course of acquiring rudimentary univer a l con-
cepts, and, then, to discover the forms and essences by ordinary di cursive 
thinking. 
II 
Aristotle distinguishes between the productive and potential intellects in De 
Anima illS. Ob erving that in the whole of nature one thing serves a 
matter for each kind, something else as ca use and producer, he concludes 
quick to attribute natfooted interpretation of Aristotle to Themistius and the ancient 
Greek commentators more generall y. See notes 20 and 24. 
4 Sec the proem to Themistius's paraphrase of the Posterior Analytic.l· and page 3 of the 
introduction to Todd's 1996 translation of Themistius's paraphrase of the De Anima. 
5 Huby 1991, 142. Tuominen 2009 , 25 makes a sim il ar observation: "Themistius is not 
striving for unity in his accounts of various issues. Rather, he aims to clarify the point 
at hand, and such clarifications may contain interpretative trends that pu ll the result-
ing whole in different directions". Todd 1996,4 7, with some hesitation, agrees with 
this assessment. 
6 Sec, e.g., Mahoney 1982. 
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~hat the e difference likewise belong to the soul (430al0- 14): one SOlt of 
Intellect serve as matter by its capacity to become all things, the other as 
cause by its power to produce all things (430aI4f.). The former is typ ically 
held to be the seat of human in tellection because in De Anima III 4 Aristotle 
tells us that the intellect thinks and knows by becoming the objects of 
thought7 - the forms or essences of material, mathematical and immaterial 
SUbstances. The assimilation model of thinking mirrors the causal structure 
?f sensing: both thinking and sensing take place when the faculties become 
Isomorphic with their objects. The intellect that thinks and knows is called 
the potential intellect (8vvCq..lEI vovs) because the intellect must be its objects 
potentially in order to become and know them actually (429al 5f.; a27- 29). 
:rhe productive intellect (lTOIT]TIKOS vovs), by contrast, is responsible for the 
Intelligibility of the material world. 
It is unclear what the productive and potential intellects are - if indeed 
they are intellect and not imply aspects thereof. Aristotle ascribes to the 
productive intellect divine characteristics. It is separate (430aI7; a22) , in its 
essence activity (430aI8) , and alone immortal and eternal (430a23) . How-
e.ver, he al 0 ugge ts that it belongs to the human soul (430a13 f.). Themis-
tlUS takes Aristotle a describing a transcendent yet immanent noetic ent ity, 
but, unlike Alexander of Aphrodisias, he does not believe it to be the prime 
mover. Themistius envisions the productive intellect as a kind of sou l -
as form inhering in matter. It is the highest and most valuable of forms in 
the natural world becau e it does not serve as matter to an ontologically 
superior form (In de an. 100,33 37). In defense of his interpretation, he 
appeals to Aristotle 's assertion that it "alone is immortal and eternal" 
(430a23). Reminding us that Aristotle recognizes a plurality of immortal 
and eternal divine beings (103,10- 13),8 he argues that this description can 
apply to the prod uctive in tellect only if it is understood to con trast the pro-
ductive intellect with other capacities of the human soul (103, 13- 15). 
. The potential intellect may be more perplexing than even the productive 
Illtellect. As Themistius explains, the developmental and discursive nature 
of human thought demands that our intellect be potential in some way. 
Potentiality is the state from which our thoughts and abilities develop, and 
the condition that enables us to transition from one thought to the next 
(94, 11 13). The problem is that Aristotle appears to endorse an intellect 
that lacks all formal a nd material qualities (a noetic equiva lent of prime 
matter) on the assumption that only a pure potentia lity is capable of know-
7 See, e. g., De 0/1. 429a 15 f.; 429b51: ; and 430a3 5. 
8 Themistius has in mind the unmoved movers described in Metaphysics /\ 8. But it is 
interes ting to no te th a t Ari totle does not describe either the divine inte llect or the 
unm oved movers as immo rtal, only as e ternal. Tha t Aristotle uses the word "immor-
ta l" to des~ribe the produc tive intellect may be an indication that, as Themistius sug-
ges ts, thIS Inte llec t ca nn o t be identified with the divine intellect. 
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ing all things (429a 18 20). The intellect, he argues, cannot possess form of 
it own, for then it would, like God, be unable to acquire forms other than 
those it already pos esse. Thi is becau e one's formal qualities character-
ize onc's nature, 0 that, should the intellect take on diffcrent forms by 
thinking new and different thought, it would tray from its nature. Ari -
totIe thereby reasons that the intellect cannot be anything in actuality be-
fore it thinks (429a24), and thereby a lso denies that it lacks a bodily organ 
(429a24 27). Themi tius sugge t that the intcllect cou ld not use an organ 
because its perceptual qualities, such as it being hot or cold, wou ld inter-
fere with the activity of thought (94,32 34).9 
Thcmistius may treat the potential intellect as a noetic entity existing sep-
arately from the human so ul (he describes it as coming to exist in (106, I 0) 
and being receivcd by us (104,14», but he appears to be aware that doing 
so is problematic. Not only does he report Theophrastus' objection to this 
line of interpretatiol1,lo he twice remarks dcfensively that Aristotle ex-
plicitly describes the intellect as such (105,30; 34f.). Still, it is not clear ju t 
how Themistiu conceives of this noetic entity. He calls it the "forerunncr 
(lTp650iJos) of thc prod uctive in tellect" (103 ,30) , expla ining that it is "as the 
[sun's] ray is to daylight" (103,31). This comparison, in turn , allows him 
to claim that the productive intellect is more separate than its potential 
forerunner (106,7). Is, then, the potential intellect causally dependcnt on its 
productive counterpart as the sun's rays to the sun? Themistius does not say. 
But because his intellect is devoid of actuality, it lacks the agency required 
for the acquisition of knowledge and its transition to a tatc of active 
thought. Themistius explains that the productive intellect perfects its po-
tential counterpart by channeling (ElTOXETEVETCXI, 100,22) its forms to it like 
a carpenter or smith who could permeate his materials thorough ly (99, 16f.). 
He insist that the union of the two noetic entit ies produces the human 
intellect, which has " two definitions - one of matter, the other of creativity" 
(99,19). But in his view, the compounded intellect does not constitute the 
essences of human beings because the productive intellect is the So urce for 
our ability to do distinctly human thin gs (100,20- 22). Thus, by his account, 
our humanity is explained on appeal to a single transcendent intellect, and 
not by so mething that situates us more firmly in the sensible and animal 
world. 
9 Scholars debate the form of Aristotle's argument beginning at 429a 18. I am here fol-
lowing Themistius' articulation of the argument. Sec, e. g., Shields 1995; Sisko 1999; 
and Politis 200 I for alternative renderings. 
10 About the intellect's na ture, Theophrastus purportedly wrote: "For that it is nothing 
in actu a lity, but all things potentiality, in just the sa me way as [the capacity for sense-
perception], is well-said. For it must not be taken in this way, that it is not even itself 
(for that is captious), but as bei ng some underlying capacity as in the case of material 
entities" (107,33 35). For a fuller discus ion of this fragment, see Gabbe 2008a. 
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One might wonder how the productive in tellect can permeate and trans-
mit its activ ity to the potential intellect, when its activity is so different from 
our own. What principally di tinguishes the productive from the potential 
in tellect is its being activi ty in essence (430a 18). Themistius understands 
this description to mean that the productive intellect is precisely the same 
as its objects. We may recall that the potential intellect, when in active con-
templation, is a lso what it thinks. However, because it thinks discursively, 
its nature ca nnot be tied to its activity. Ifit were, it would be essentially dif-
ferent from one thought to the next and , when not active, would not even 
be itself. I I Conversely, because the productive intellect is essentially what 
it thinks, it does not think at one moment but not at the next, its thinking is 
not uccessive, and , unlike the potential intellect which acquires knowledge 
thro ugh sense-perception and the sepa ration of form from matter, it does 
not depend on an ex ternal object for its activity. Its thinking, we are told , is 
non-discursive insofar as it i immed iate and does not pass from form to 
form: "It has all the forms all together and presents a ll of them to itself at the 
same time. For only in this way would its essence and its activity be, as Aris-
totle says, identical" (100,10f.). Themistius appeals to the potential intel-
lec t's status as noetic matter to explain how it can receive the productive 
intellect's activity but not its nature. Our understanding of the received 
forms is ' divided ', he ex plains, because of the character of the intellect that 
receives them. The potential intellect cognizes the forms by means of dis-
cursive thought, because the potential intellect is as matter for its productive 
co unterpart and matter particularize , pluralizes and divides (100,22- 26). 
Themistius defends the tenabil ity of transcendent-immanency by draw-
ing a parallel to the sun and its light. He writes: 
The intellect that illuminates (eAAcX\.l1TWV) is primarily one, while those that are illumi-
nated (EAAa\.l1T6~EvOI) and that illuminate (EAM~TroVTES) are, just like light, more than 
onc. For whilc the sun is one, yo u co uld speak of light as in a sense divided among the 
organs of sight. That is why Aristotle introduced as a compa ri son not the sun but [its 
derivativeJl ight [ .. . J. (103,32 35)12 
The idea seems to be that, like daylight, the productive intellect remains one 
though divided. However, scho lars are not agreed on the interpretation 
of this passage. The source of the ambiguity lies with the participles 
EAAcqmwv, EAAO"mOI-\EVOI and EAACxI-\TIOVTES, for it is not obvious what they 
refer to or how much emphasis they shou ld be given. Verbeke, following 
Siger of Brabant, takes them all to refer to the productive intellect(s) .13 In 
their view, Themistius recognizes a plurali ty of subordinate productive in-
II Priscian records Theophrastus as hav ing made the very same observation. See III de 
seils. 29,18 23 and 30,22 25. 
12 With only minor modifications, trans lations of the In de all. are from Todd 1996. 
11 See Verbeke 1957 for a survey of the historical interpretations ofThem istius's produc-
tive intellect. 
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tellects in addition to a single superior one. The ubordinate intellects are 
thought to illuminate the potential intellect from the illumination they re-
ceive from the principal productive intellect. The multip le productive intel-
lects are, thus, both EAAa~.lTTojJEVOI and EAACxjJlTOVTES. Aquinas, by contrast, 
denies the unity of the productive intellect altogether. On his view, each in-
dividual has her own productive intellect illuminated by God (EAACxjJlTWv), 
which in turn illuminates her own potential intellect. Taking each participle 
to refer to a different noetic entity, he thereby reads EAACxjJlTOVTES as refer-
ring to our unique productive intellects and EAAajJlTojJEvOI to Our potential 
intellects. Yet there are many who remain unconvinced that Themistius rec-
ognizes a plurality of productive intellects. Averroes, llenry Bate ofMalines 
and M. Bruno Nardi maintain that Themistius's productive intellect is ca-
pable of communicating itself to a plurality of souls without losing its unity. 
Indeed, though Themistius notes that one could speak (EIlTOlS) of light a di-
vided by the objects it illuminates (103,34), he earlier says that light is prin-
cipally one because the source of li ght, the sun , is one (103,22 f.). Moreover, 
Themistius argued in the preceding lines th at there cou ld not be a plurality 
of productive intellects because a multiplicity ofproduetive intellects would 
require differentiation by a di tinguishing feature - either form or matter 
(103,20- 32). But if productive intellects cannot possess matter, neither can 
they differ in their forms or activities. Were they to differ from one another 
in term of what they think, an explanat ion would be needed as to why in-
dividuals received the intellects they did. And if a n individual received a 
productive intellect that did not think all of its forms, that per on cou ld not 
think all things, despite Aristotle's in si tence to the contrary (429a 18). The 
productive intellect, Themistius conclude, must be one to en ure mutual 
understanding. "Where otherwi e", he asks, "do the sha red notions (Kolval 
EVVOlOl) come from? Where is the untaught and identica l understanding of 
the primary definitions (lTPWTWV 8pwv) and primary axioms (lTPWTWV 
Cx~IWjJCxTWV) derived from?" ( 103,38 104,2). 
III 
Themistius maintains that the productive intellect is in some way respon-
sible for the acqu isition and contemplation of the objects of thought. "The 
actual intellect", he reports, "advances the potential intellect, and not only 
makes it an actual intellect, but also constitutes its potentia l objects of 
thought (TO 8VVCxjJEl VOllTO) as actual objects (EVEpyEi<;x VOllTO)" (99, I 3). 
Our goal is to understand how it does so. 
In Aristotle's view, the objects of thought (VOllTCx) are the intelligible 
forms that account for essentia l natures. Articulation of an object's intelli-
gible form wi ll answer the question: What is it to be that object? And be-
cause Aristotle holds that forms belong to ensible objects, he believes that 
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know ledge derives from ense-perception and imagination, the faculty that 
~~etal~s sens~ impressions. "The objects of thoughts (TCx VOllTCx) ", he writes, 
are In sensible forms (l:v TOIS E'ioEm TOIS o i<J611ToIS) [ ... J and therefore, no 
one can learn or understand anything without sense-perceiving" (432a4- 8). 
For this reason , he con tinues, "when one thinks, one necessarily thinks 
a long with a n image (cq..lo <pOVTcX<JJ..!OTI)" (432a8f.) . It is not clear how Aris-
to tle conceives the role of images in thinking. He elsewhere describes intel -
!ection a thinking the form in the image (l:v TOIS <pOvTcX<JJ..!om, 43 I b2). What 
1 certain is that images have particularity and are therefore not thoughts. 
But because they contain or represent the form of sensible objects, they are 
aptly described as intelligibles in potency. 
According to Themistius, the productive intellect enables us to grasp the 
form of an object thanks to its act ion 0 11 both the potential intellect and the 
intelligibles in potency. He writes: 
As light whcn supervenin g on potential sight and pOlential co lors produces both actu al 
sight and actua l colors, so too this ac tua l intellect advance the potentia l intellect, and 
not on ly makes it a n actua l intellect, but a lso renders its potential objects of thought as 
actu a l objects. (98 ,35 99,2) 
The comparison made here between the productive intellect and light has 
its source in the De Anima . Aristotle there writes that the productive intel-
lect is "as a s tate (ws E~ I S TIS) such as light, for in a manner light makes 
potential co lors actua l" (430aIS- 17) . Yet, on his theory, light actualizes the 
visua l faculty as well as colors.1 4 His a nalogy thus suggests that the produc-
tive intellect plays the dual role attributed to it by T hemistius. Still , we must 
ask how far Themistius means to press the comparison. Does he take it to 
show simply that the productive intellect actua li zes the potential intellect 
a nd its objects both , or does he a lso conceive it to show how the actualiz-
a tion is accomplished? The difficulty is that Themistius, on the one hand , 
employs the im ile of light and the language of illumination, but, on the 
other ha nd , writes that the productive intellect "cha nnel s (l:TroXETEVETat) its 
activity to the potential intellect" ( 100,22), " fully co nstitutes its disposition 
[for thinking]" (E~IV KOTO<JKEVcX~EI, 98,32) and " is most like a god ; for god is 
indeed in one way the things that a re themselves, but in a nother their sup-
plie r" (XOPlly6S, 99,24f.). O ur aim is to reconcile the claims that knowledge 
is communicated directly from the productive intellect, but is also acquired 
through its act ion on both the potential intellect and the potentially intelli-
gible. 
There are a number of ways to approach this interpretive problem. We 
might, for instance, downplay the significa nce of the light analogy by reject-
ing the idea that Themi tius espo Ll sed a theory of illumination. Conversely, 
14 For detail s on light's nature and ro le in vi ion , see A ri sto tle's De all. 418£126 b20 and 
Seils. 438b2 16. 
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we might take e riously his language of illuminat ion a nd , instead, deem-
phasize the productive intellect' role as communicator of form . The pre-
vailing view is that the productive intell ect operates like light in the most lit-
eral ense. D avidson even cha racteri zes Themi tian intellection in terms of 
perception. 15 He writes: 
I n other words, the active intelleet , funetioning as a sort of ligh t, activates both images 
in the sou l, wh ich are potential thoughts, and the hum a n potential intelleet; and it 
thereby enables the potential intellect to perceive actual thoughts a nd to beeome act ual 
itself. (Dav idso n 1992, 26 . The emphasis is mine.) 
To take Themistius's use of'light' at face va lue is to a cribe to him a theory 
of illumination according to which the intellection of for ms is both immedi-
ate a nd infa llibl e. For this interpretive approach treats the acquisition of 
form s as directly ana logou to the activity of seeing. Aristotle holds that 
one wi ll stra ightaway see when the appro priate conditions obtain (when 
there is light and the eyes are properly functi oning) , because seeing doc not 
develop and progress through the course of time. To use hi expres ion , as 
soon as one sees one has seen.16 Further, it is his view that one cannot err 
wi th regard to the proper objects (418a 14 f.). Error in perceptio n does Occur, 
but, he expla ins, on ly in the judgment of what is perceived and where it is. 
(If, for in tance, a woman ees yellow beca use of jaundice, her sen in g of 
ye llow is accurate because her eyes a re yellow, though her judgment that her 
environs are yellow is not.) 
On the theory of illumination common ly attributed to Themistius, the 
acq ui sition of forms (as opposed their eo ntemplation)l ? is made immediate 
by the illuminative powers of the productive intellect. So while our knowl-
edge is derived from sense-perception , our experiences serve only as prep-
aration for the understa nding achieved throu gh this divine or divine-like 
operation. Therefore, the acq uisition of forms does not require either reOec-
tion or the application of a methodological procedure to our experiences. If, 
15 See a lso Moraux 1978,3 11 ; Taylor 2007, 136; and Verbeke, 1957, LVII I. Comparing 
Themistius's int erpreta tion to Aquinas's, who endorses a rob ust theory of illumi-
nation, Verbeke writes: "[oo .]Ia difference entre Themistius ct sa int Thomas eonsiste 
dans Ie fait que, pour ee dernier, I' aetio n de I'intelleet agent se rapporte uniquement 
aux donnees sensiblcs en vue de les rendre intelligibles, landis que pour Ie eommen ta-
teur gree I'aetio n de I'intellect aetif vise direetement I' intellect reeeptif et les inte lli-
gibles en pui sa nee: les deux sont direetement aetualises par I'i ntelleet aelif." 
16 See Meta. e 6, 1048b23, b33; a nd Seils. 6, 446b2 f. 
17 Ari totle says th a t as soon as one understa nd s, o ne ha s understood, a nd as Soo n as 
one thinks, one has th o ught ( I 048b23 f.). But we need no t think th at he is here making 
reference to the immediate and infallible 'procc s' by wh ich we come to possess the 
forms. Aristotle may only mean that the ac tivi ty of thinking is complete i. e., non-
progres ·ive. And it is a truism th at o ne ca nn ot be in erro r with regards to what one 
knows. Thus, the theory that the con templa ti o n of forms is both immediate and infal-
lible is unproblematic. 
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for instance, we wanted to know what it is to be a huma n being, we need no t 
ask ourselve what distinguishes human bein gs from other animals or what 
specia l features we have that are most sa lient for explaining what we a re. 
And surveyin g the opinions of o ur predecessors wiII provide no insight into 
Our investigation. The presence of the right image is, theoretica IIy, a II that is 
necessa ry for the apprehension of form. Moreover, one cannot be mistaken 
about the things that a re sa lient to an expla nation of what x is or why x is so. 
Because o ur knowledge is owed to the activity of a transcendent noetic en-
tity, there is no room for error. T hus, th e prevai ling view takes Themistius to 
endorse a theory of in tuition - a kind of non-discursive, or non-inferenti a l, 
thinking. There is, in addition, a more radica l form of non-discursive think-
ing - namely, thinking that is non-propositional. This form of co nscious-
ness involves thinking a n o bject of tho ught without thinking anyth ing 
about it. I sha II in due cou rse discuss whether either type of thinking has a 
place in Themist ia n noetics. But we might first note that Aristotle was simi-
la rl y thought to have espo used such a theory. 
One co uld easi ly conclude from the opening lines to his discuss ion of vovs 
that Ar isto tle end orses an iIIumination theory of in teIIection. Fo r his inves-
ti gation proceeds on the assumption that th inking is analogous to sensing 
(429a13 18). Furthermore, by caIIing the inteIIigible objects ' indivisibles' 
(TO: 6:010(pETO, De an. III 6, 430a26, b6) and ' incomposites ' (TO: O:CJVV8ETO, 
Me /a . e 10, 105 1 b 17) a nd asserting that they are known by contact (81YETv, 
1051 b24), " in a simple time and by a simple act of the soul" (430b 15),18 he 
seems to uggest that the objects of thought are grasped by a special mode 
of intellection - one that necessar ily yields the truth. 19 And these remarks, 
in turn, appear to support a reading of the last chapter of the Posterior Ana-
Iy /ics, whereby A ri stotle was thought to treat vovs as an intuitive facu lty 
res po nsible fo r the apprehension of the first principles.20 However, the view 
that we intuit the inte lligible objects is currently out of favor and it is not 
hard to see why. The idea that our kn owledge of form s is acquired by an act 
of in tuition or iIIuminative abstraction runs counter to our experiences. On 
this view, the apprehens ion offorms sho uld be neither laborio us nor subject 
to error, when the history of philosophy attests to the difficulty of articu lat-
ing definitions. And as M. F rede points out, such a view supposes that we 
acquire forms individua IIy a nd in a piecemeal fashion. 21 But understanding 
what something is involves discerning its essential features, explaining how 
18 Berti 1978 provides a non-intu itionist acco unt o f Aristotk 's ind ivi ibles and incom-
posites. Yet with little explana ti o n, he tics Themistius to the view that Aristotle's use 
o f the e terms demonstrates that he ascribes to a fo rm o f P laton ic intuitionism. See, in 
pa rticular, page 146 and note 28. 
19 See De all. III 6, 430a26 f. ; b29 C; Meta. e 10, 105 1 b25 f. 
20 This, for in ·ta nce, is W. D. Ross ' read in g. Sec pages 47- 51 of his introduction to his 
tex t and commenta ry of Aristo tle' Prior alld Posterior Al1aly tics. 
21 See Frede 1996, 17 1 for his account o f concept acqu isiti on. 
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these feature relate to its other nece sary but non-e ential a ttributes, and 
articulating how this object relates to other things and phenomena. There-
fore, the acquisition of forms is co ntingent upon su ndry experiences and in-
choate bits of knowledge a ll of which need to be generalized, sys tematized 
a nd structured. F ina lly, the acts involved in intuition are difficult to under-
stand. Most troubling is the notion that images are ubject to trans-
formation that en mattered forms, the form s of natural and mathematical 
object which are somehow latent in the images stored in memory, need to 
be actu a lized before the potential intellect can gras p hold or them. If the 
productive intellect were to act on images so as to render them capable of 
affecting or, as it were, bein g 'seen' by the potential intellect, they wou ld 
have to be made universal and incorporea l that is, they would have to be 
tran formed into a thought. But such a theory makes the potential intellect 
redundant, because it a ll ows there to be thoughts without Intellects thi nk-
ing them. 22 
Returnin g to Themistius, we mi ght ask why interpreters so often suppose 
him to end o r e a theory o f illumination. R. Taylor, who offers the best rea-
son, believes Themistius's productive intellect to be the SO urce for our 
knowledge by thinking the extent of what we can know. His reading hinges 
on the ambiguity of passage 103,32- 35, wherein Themistius makes mention 
of the illuminatin g (EAACxI.l1TOVTES) a nd illuminated (EAACq.mO I.lEV0 1) intellects. 
Taylor take Themistius to recognize a single transcendent productive intel-
lect that engenders a multitude of imma nent illuminating intellects. On his 
interpretatio n, these so-called 'actual intellects' produce knowledge by the 
illumina tive power they derive from the content of the productive intellect's 
thought,23 T he subordinate intellec ts, he hold s, do not think the form s lest 
we all share the sa me knowledge. 24 The human intellect produces its own 
22 On the a 'sumption that (a) the senses perceive o nl y sensible qu a lities li ke co lo rs, 
smell s, so unds a nd (b) images arc mere by-products o f the senses ' ac tivity. C. 11 . Kahn 
argues tha t the intellection of form cannot proceed by the tra nsformation o r actuali Z-
a ti on of images. "Otherwise", he writes, "something would come from no thin g ( ... be-
ca use] we do not perceive ei ther that they a rc individuals or th a t they a rc ofa definite 
kind" (Kahn 198 1,407). Kahn 's suggestio n, ultimately, is that th e intellect must have 
a n intimate relat io n with t he senses in order to acco unt for the way humans perceive. 
Perception for us is concept laden and , hence, requires the invo lvement of the intellect. 
This involvement, in turn , makes the ab tract ion of fo rm from images unn ecessa ry, 
mce the 1I11 eliect mu t a lready possess concepts for images to se rve as the basis for ab-
stractive intellecti on. Kahn docs not attr ibute to Themi stius a th eo ry of illuminative 
a?s tracti o n , but he docs criticize him ro r insist in g that the senses a lo ne perceive indi-
Vidua ls as individua ls o f a cer ta in kind the very assumption that makes possible a ny 
theory o r illuminative abst racti o n (K a hn 1992, 37 1 r. no te 24). However, Themistius 
makes no such mistake. See Gabbe 2008b for Themistiu 's accou nt of incidental per-
ception. 
23 Tay lor 2007 , 128 and 136. 
24 Taylor 2007, 135 r. 
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thoughts and it does so via illuminative abstraction and form s that preexist 
in the tran cendent intellect. 
If Themistius does believe the productive intellect to think the extent of 
what huma ns can know, then there is no getting around it - he ascribes to 
Aristot le a theory of intuition. Indeed, two remarks would lead one to this 
supposition. We are told that the productive intellect " has all the form s all 
together" ( 100,9) and that, in order for the potential intellect to be capable 
o[ knowing all things, it mu st think "all objects" (103,30- 32). But these 
remarks must be ta ken in their proper context. Themistius makes the 
rirst remark hortly after explaining that the productive intellect does not 
think the fo rm of the natura l wo rld . He write: " Being both intellect and 
object of thought, it is precisely the same, [ ... and not] on acco unt of an-
other [object] , like the remaining objects of thought that the intellect we' 
E~ IV produces by separating them [rom matter" (99,38- 100,3). The inte llect 
Kae' E~IV - the intellect with the disposition to think - apprehends the [orms 
o[ the natural world by separating them [rom their particularizing condi-
tions. Hence, becau e the apprehension of these forms depends upon the 
ex istence of sensible objects and because the productive intellect 's activity 
and essence a re due to itself, Themistius concludes that it cannot think 
them. 
That Themistius's productive intellect thinks less objects than its poten-
tia l co unterpa rt is further evidenced by his response to the objection that 
superiority is commensurate with the number of objects thought. He writes: 
"a more va luable intellect is not one that thinks a greater number of [ob-
jects], but one that thinks better [objects]" (11 2,6). In Themistius's view, the 
rirst cau e can think only itself, "what is form most of all" (112,2). This is 
because it complete detachment from potentiality and privation precludes 
it from thinking anything else. His productive intellect, by contrast, is inti-
mately tied to the natural world and so is not quite as limited as the first 
ca use. However, because it too lacks potentiality, it cannot cognize pri-
vations, matter, and objects that are bad ( 114,36- 11 5,1). Because the defi-
nitions of natural objects implicate (CJVVE<pEAKETOl) matter (7,29; 114,2 1), 
only the human intellect, which manifests potentiality, can think them. 
For Themistius, most of what we come to know, including the principles 
of science, are not intuited by cosmic transmission or participation. Our 
abi lity to apprehend forms does not depend upon access we have to forms 
that exist separately from the physical world. What, then, does he mean 
when he describes the productive intellect as havi ng "all the forms all to-
gether" (l00,9) and thinking "all objects" (103,30- 32)? I suggest that the 
' a ll ' in these quotes is qualified. It does not mean 'a ll that there is to know', 
but 'all that it does and must of necessity know'. 
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IV 
Let us begin our investigation into the productive intellect's role and func-
tion afresh, since our analy is has so far been negative. Themistius reports 
that the productive intellect furni hes the potential intellect with a E~IS for 
VOEIV: " it perfects the suitability (EV<pV{OV) of the oul for thinking (TO VOEIV), 
and fully constitute its dispo ition (E~ IV KOToaKEv6l;El)" (98,31 f.) . Gen-
era lly speaking, Themistiu could mean one of two things: either that the 
productive intellect perfects the potential intellect as the proximate cause 
of its knowledge, that it does so indirectly by giving the potential intellect 
the power to acquire the objects of thought by itself. The prevailing view 
takes Themistius to espouse the form er position insofar as it presumes the 
productive intellect to actualize intelligible forms by dirCl:t action on the 
images. The assumption i th at the potential intellect cannot gain insight 
into the causes and essences of things by itself, and so, in order for it to 
VOEIV, it must be stockpiled with the forms. The alternative view, by contrast, 
allows the potential intellect to acquire knowledge by means of the ability it 
receives from the productive intellect to think in the broade t sense of the 
word . 
The first place to look for clarity on this issue is Themistius's account of 
VOEIV, which can construed as evidence for the prevailing view much in the 
way that certain of Aristotle's remarks can be taken as evidence for orne 
kind of divine insight. Themistius reports that VOEIV is the grasping of 
the simple definitions (TOUS CnTAOVS opovs, 30,25) and involves the direct en-
counter (E1Tl!30Arl) and contact (e{~IS) with the objects of thought (30,32). 
However, he later reports that " the intellect's E1Tl!30Arl with the objects of 
thought for someone who already has the E~ IV is, just as the activity and E1Tl-
!30ATj of a specia li st relative to his objects, not a movement but an activity, 
since it is of something perfect and is perfect itself" ( 11 2,30 32).25 This re-
mark suggests that he understands E1Tl!30Arl and e{~IS to indicate the insight 
we obtain once in possession of knowledge, rather than a mode by which we 
apprehend the objects. Moreover, he interprets Ari totle ' description of the 
objects of thought as uncombined as a reOection of the unity of the thing 
known and the intellect's general abi lity to think in a n indivisible amount of 
time. 26 The intellect, he states, doe the ame when it combines these simple 
things signified in an act of discur ive thinking: "This <abi lity> is just one 
of the marvels of the intellect" (110,22). 
But might Themistius countenance non-propositional thinking nonethe-
less? In his J 970 article, A. C. Lloyd argued that non-propo itional think-
ing, what he understands by VOEIV, is a genuine form of thinking. On the 
25 Cr. 111 de WI . 30 32 a nd 111 , 18 24. 
26 Themistius devotes much of his paraphrase of chapter six of book three of the De 
Anill/o to thi s iss ue. Sec, in particu lar, In de all. 109,4 11 2,24. 
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assumption that OlOVOElcy6m (discursive thinking) differs from VOEIV in that 
it involves the transition from one thought to the next, Lloyd supposes that 
it must be possible to VOEIV concepts apart from their occurrence within a 
proposition. This would happen, he argues, if a person were interrupted in 
the course of thinking a propositional statement. And in this case, the per-
Son would know and think of some object without thinking anything about 
it. Hence, in his view, OlOVOElcy6m requires vOElv. 
Themistius addres es the question of whether VOEIV is a part of OlOVOEI-
CY6ol. And were he to draw the same conclusion as Lloyd, we would have 
grounds for supposing, not just that VOEIV is for him non-propositional, but 
also that his productive intellect operates as a proximate cause of the ob-
jects of thought. For on this account of OlOvoElcy6m, the grasping of the 
simple definitions would be required for the most basic type of thinking 
and , hence, the potential intel lect wou ld be precluded from acquiring its ob-
jects through ordinary reflection . However, Themistius's concern in ad-
dressing this question reveals that he does not share Lloyd's account ofvoElv 
and OlOVOElcy6ol. Themistius writes that if OlOVOElcy6m involved vOElv, then 
the lesser activity would require the superior. It would be as if the crafts-
man'sjob were to know wood a nd stone in and of themselves, as opposed to 
knowing them only in their combination (30,28- 30). Accordingly, Themis-
tius distinguishes the two kinds of thinking, not in terms of their mode of 
apprehension, but in terms of their relation to the objects of thought: 
Just like the contrast between poor sight and clear vision, VOEIV involves an ETTl~oATj 
(direct encounter) and 6i~ls (contact) with the object of thought, whereas CiovoEla601 is 
like a movement in the direction of the object that amounts to an approach in a state 
too weak to retain the object without its being dispersed. (30,32- 34). 
LllOvoElcy6m , we are told, describes the kind of thinking used to obtain 
knowledge of the object, VOEIV the thinking employed once knowledge 
is achieved. Hence, he calls the objects combined in discursive thinking "the 
simple things signified" as opposed to " the simple things defined", his pre-
ferred expression for the objects of vOElv. 27 
We can learn more about the productive intellect's role in human thought 
by examining Themistius 's account of intellectual development in the 
passage quoted below. As we shall see, there is no explicit mention of the 
productive intellect here (Themistius has yet to introduce it); however, when 
this passage is paired with a later description of the productive intellect's 
effect on its potential counterpart, a picture emerges of what state it brings 
about and how. Themistius writes: 
27 
N ow this potential intellect comes into existence even among infants. But when, from 
the objects of perception ((mo TWV ola61lTwv) and imaginings of them (TWV (me) 
TOIJTWV cpo vToalwv) and the training associated with them (TTjS TIEpi TOVTO yv~voaios), 
f. 109,6, 10, 18; 11 2, 14; and 30,24f. 
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it is able to hunt the universa l and group together what is similar in dissimilar objects 
and what is identica l in dilTerent objects (,6 KaeOAOV 5uvT),aI eT)peUelV Kai avv6:yelv ,6 
OIJ010V EV ,OlS aVOIJOi01S Koi ,6 ,a\lTov ~v ,015 510<p0P0l5), it then becomes a more per-
fect intellect, analogous to so meone with specialized knowledge who has latched on to 
the theorems of his discipline and is able to be active by himself by making each of 
them individually avai lable for himself, without the need for any external instruction. 
At that tage too, therefore, the intellect is in potentiality, ye t not in the sa me way as be-
fore it learnt (IJOeelv) or made discovcries (eupelv). For something like thc capacity for 
sight, not previously present in it, comes to be in it , in that it can see similar and dis-
simi la r objects, and what [in those objects) is identical a nd dilTerent, a nd is implied a nd 
is in connict (eyyivETaI yap olov 0\1'15 a\1T0 lTpooepov OUK evovao OpO'IKT] ,c;:,v olJoiwv 
Kai , c;:,v avolJoiwv Koi hepov Kai aKOAOUeOV Koi lJoxolJevov). (95,9 19) 
Described above are two levels of intellectual ach ievcment. '[ he first level of 
perfection corresponds to the achievement of an ordinary pcrson who has 
not received a specialized education. This person has a grasp of universal 
concepts such that she can appropriately group together (avvaYElv) dissimi-
lar things and recognize when discrete objects share certain features or 
causes in common. She is not, however, able to articulate fully what essen-
tially characterizes the groups of objects, because she cannot provide defi-
nitions or articulate the causes of why some thing or fact is so. Thus, she 
has linguistic competency, but only a non-scientific gra p of the concepts 
she uses. By contrast, the second level of perfection characterizes someone 
who has obtained scientific and theoretical knowledge. Themistius reports 
that obtaining this level of expertise requires knowing the totality of theor-
ems belonging to that discipline (95,23 25). A person with this knowledge 
will have in her command the primary definitions and axioms, as well as 
the propo itions or theorems derived from them. And her knowled ge will be 
evidenced by her ability to call the axioms and theorems to mind without 
external aid. 
It will prove useful to make a few observations about the quote above be-
fore turning to our second passage. The first thing to note is that the two le-
vels of intellectual completion are brought about in entirely different ways. 
Linguistic competency requires the activity of the sense faculties alongside 
some training associated with them; scientific and theoretica l understand-
ing require learning and discovery. Second, there is nothing my terious 
or magical about how either of these E~EIS are obtained . The intellect devel-
ops from sense-experience and training led by our parents and caregivers. 
By means of these activities, we learn to group together things that are 
relevantly similar and apply generalized terms to objects, attributes, and 
phenomena. We seek the principles and theorems of a cience using our 
weak and inchoate grasp of the universal , because at this point we possess 
language skills by which we can learn through enquiry and study. Third, the 
only remark in the quote above that could resonate with the proponent of 
the illumination theory involves the reference to the capacity for sight that 
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springs up during some late stage of our development (95, 17 f.). One might 
think that this capacity refers to the productive intellect. However, our 
newly endowed 'vision' does not explain our ability to apprehend or acquire 
forms ; rather, it characterizes our state once in possession of knowledge. 
With knowledge we have the ability to see with clarity and precision what is 
similar and identical in different objects and what it is implied by and in 
conf1ict with this piece of understanding. And we might note that Themis-
tius's use of vision is here consistent with his use of bTl~oATj and ei ~ I S. 
It is striking that Alexander of Aphrodisias also recognizes these same le-
vels of intellectual perfection , because he does not conceive the productive 
intellect as the proximate cause of our thoughts. 28 Like Themistius, Alex-
ander maintains that the perfected or ' acquired' intellect possesses scientific 
and theoretical knowledge. 29 He explains that this E~IS is characterized by 
the knower's (or intellect's) ability to think in absence of external resources 
and holds that it belongs only to the most gifted and disciplined. Moreover, 
Alexander concedes that all humans share in this E~IS insofar as we all have 
some apprehension of the universal and some synthetic knowiedge30 - that 
is to ay, insofar as we all have linguistic competency and some common 
sense. According to Alexander, th is first level of perfection is acquired as we 
grow and mature much in the way that we learn to walk: it develops nat-
urally with some practice over time.31 
The productive intellect , in Alexander's view, plays only an indirect role 
in the acquisition of knowledge. Alexander explain that what is being most 
or all , or what most especially manifests some property, is the cause of other 
things and properties of this sort (88 ,26- 89,1). Therefore, since the produc-
tive intellect is the most intelligible of beings (88 ,25) , it is the cause of all 
things intelligible. Still , he does not mean that the productive intellect pro-
duces actual thoughts; for it does not communicate form or illuminate 
those contained in images. It is responsible for the intelligibility of the cos-
mos insofa r as it is the ultimate cause of its structure, order, stability and 
bea uty the very qu alities that make it knowable. 
28 Alexa nder's De Allima is not exactly a commenta ry on Aristot le's. He wrote one, but it 
is now lost. Yet becau e he end orses Aristotle's account or the oul, his treatise reads 
like an exposition or hi mas ter's. See DA 2,4- 9. 
29 See, ro r insta nce, Alex . DA 82, I 3. 
30 Alexa nder states that it is best to call the intellect that has obtained this first level of 
achievement the "commo n intellect" (0 KOIVOS vovs) as opposed to the "acquired in-
tellect" his name ror the intcllect possessed or scientific knowledge (82, 14) . Themis-
tius a lso recognizes a common intellect, but he identifies it with Aristotle's TTo61lT1KOS 
vovs. Compare lines 106, 14r. ofThemistius's paraphrase with lines 430a23- 25 or Aris-
totle's De Anima. 
I I See Alex. DA 82, I 15. Themistius also analogize intellectua l development to walking 
a nd then running (111 0/1 . post. 65,24- 28 ). 
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That Themistius also does not make the productive intellect the proxi-
mate cause of our thoughts can be argued from analysis of the following 
passage, wherein he describes the potential intellect before and after being 
affected by the productive intellect: 
[The] actual intellect adva nce ' the potential intellect, and not only makes it an actual 
intellect, but also constitutes its potential objects of thought as actual objects. These 
are the enmatlered forms, i. e. , the universal thoughts (Kolva VOTj~OTO) assembled 
from particular objects of perception. Up to this point the potential intellect cannot 
discern (510Kpivat) <the universal thou ghts>, make transitions from one thought to the 
other, or combine and divide them. Instead , like a store-house of thoughts (e"crovpos 
VO"~CXTWV) , it deposits (Tie"crIV) the imprints from perception and imagination through 
the agency of memory. But when the productive inte llect enco unte rs it lind ta kes over 
this 'matter' of thoughts, the potential intellect beco mes one with it, a nd beco mes able 
to make transition s, and to combine and divide thoughts a nd to observe thou ghts from 
the [perspective of] one another. (99, I 10) 
The passage opens with the claim that the productive intellect furnishes the 
potential intellect with the objects of thought. He describes these as the en-
mattered forms, having in mind the intelligible forms of natural and math-
ematical en tities. Prior to its join ing wi th the productive intellect, the poten-
tial intellect cannot in any way apprehend the forms apart from their matter 
and, therefore, cannot form propositions, make judgments or draw infer-
ences. In other words, it cannot think di cursively because it does not have 
concepts at its disposal. Its work consists solely in the depositing of "im-
prints from perception and imagination through the agency of memory" 
(99,7f.). At this point, the potential intellect is cognizant of the meld of 
sense-experiences preserved by imagination and memory but unable to 
make any sense of them. Thus, we can conclude that the productive intellect 
enters the human soul before the individual begins to attach words to ob-
jects and that it has some role in the actualization of both E~EIS. 
There is nothing in this passage to suggest that the productive intellect 
perfects the potential intellect at either stage by its power to illuminate 
images and stockpile it with the forms. Themistius says that we acquire con-
cepts by tracking or hunting down (6TlPEVEIV) the universal from the objects 
of perception (95, II ). 32 The verb 6TlPEVEIV itself suggests that the search 
for the universal is a process unfolding over time - a process that can admit 
of error. In fact, Themistius typically uses 6TlPEVEIV in place of, or in connec-
tion with, some kind of inquiry. 33 And while concept mastery cannot 
involve a genuine inquiry at this stage of our intellectual development we 
do not have lingu istic competency - his verb cho ice suggests that, at the 
very least, it involves some kind of procedure with regard to our sense-per-
32 Aristotle uses this verb in All. post. 131 , 88a3 in connection with our earch for the 
universal. 
33 Cf. his u e ofe"pevEIV at lines 5, 10, 42,8 and 49 ,34 of his paraphrase of the De Allima. 
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ception s. Moreover, if the productive intellect gives to the potential intellect 
the capacity to track down the universal , then for Themistius, our abi lity to 
engage our intellects must happen before they are stockpiled with concepts. 
The prevailing interpretation cannot accommodate this idea. Scholars in-
sist that the productive intellect is required for the actua lization of the in-
telligible objects on the assumption that the potential intellect lacks the 
agency to think prior to being possessed of the forms. Yet the suggestion of 
the above passage is that the productive intellect perfects its potential 
counterpart by giving it the ability to form concepts by itself. 
Now if the productive intellect is not the proximate cause of concept ac-
quisition, it does not provide us with insight into definitions and essences 
either. Themistius tells us that discursive reasoning advances us to knowl-
edge of the object (30,32-34), that "we ought [ ... ] more than anything else 
inquire (l;llTEiv) into the forms without matter" (112,23), and that " the in-
tellect Ko6' E~ lV (pres umably, the intellect possessed of universal concepts) 
produces the objects of thought by separating them from matter" (100,2 f.). 
Indeed, we see him put these ideas into practice in the opening to his para-
phrase. In De Anima I 1, Aristotle discusses how best to approach the in-
quiry into the soul. Themistius gives substantial attention to this introduc-
tory chapter and reports that the follow ing are useful for discovering 
essence and articulating defini tions: (a) understanding the problems that 
beset an inquiry (5,1- 3); (b) tallying the properties of the object under in-
vestigation (5,3- 26); and (c) considering the opinions of one's predecessors 
(8,38- 9,2). The e observations and reflections, Themistius notes, will not 
necessa rily or universa lly lead to a correct definition , because there is no 
single way of seeking definitions (5 ,26- 30). The task, he says, is very diffi-
cu lt a nd he rema rks that the methodology for providing definitions was 
under dispute even in his day: 
Fo r even today it is disputed among philoso phers what in general the method of deli-
nition is, and by what procedure it progresses [ ... ]. For [ . .. ] some believe that there is a 
single method [ ... but] other [believe] that [ .. . ] the ways of dealing with delinitions 
differ in accordance with diffe rences in things that exist. (2,9- 16) 
Such sensitivities fly in the face of the illumination reading. We could 
hardly be mistaken or struggle to find the best approach to the discovery of 
a definition , if the productive intellect makes essential natures manifest to 
LI S. It looks, then, as if Themistius takes the productive intellect to actualize 
its po tential counterpart by giving it the ab ility, first, to acquire concepts, 
and, then , by means of ordinary thinking, to discover definitions and 
essences. But if this is the case, then we must conclude that his productive 
intellect plays only an indirect role in the actualization of the intelligible 
form s. 
There is clear precedence for this kind of approach to knowledge 
formation in the Mantissa, a treatise on the intellect attributed to Alex-
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ander of Aphrodisias. 34 In this work, it is explained that the productive in-
tellect perfects the potential intellect by being thought. The theory is that by 
thinking the productive intellect, what lacks a\l matter, we obtain the im-
petus and ability to acquire the objects of thought from images produced by 
sense-perception. The productive intellect serves as a model to imitate and, 
thereby, gives us the ability to separate and abstract form from matter 
(l 08, 19- 26). It remains, then, for us to say how in Themistius's view the pro-
ductive intellect furnishes its potential counterpart with the ability to learn 
and think. I have so far argued that the productive intellect does not literally 
illuminate forms in images, but the same cannot be said for its role as com-
municator. Thus our question becomes: What form s does the productive 
intellect channel to its potential counterpart so as to give it the ability to ac-
quire concepts and knowledge for itself? 
Because Themistius did not make his views explicit, we can only specu-
late as to what he had in mind. Davidson suggests that the productive intel-
lect directly communicates the shared notions and the primary definitions 
and axioms. His evidence comes from the following passage: 
There is no need to be puzzled if we who are combined from the potential and actual 
[intellects] are referred back to one prod uctive intellect [oo.]. Where otherwise do the 
shared notions (Kolval Evvola l) come from? Where is the untaught and identica l under-
standing of the primary definitions (rrp(;'>Twv opwv) and primary axioms (rrpwTU)v 
6:~IW~CXTWV) derived from? For we would not understand one another unless there were 
a single intellect that we all shared. (103,36 104,3) 
It is easy to see how Davidson arrived at his interpretation. Insofar as the 
primary definitions and axioms are untaught, they might very well be chan-
neled directly to and , thus, intuited by the potential intellect. 35 However, 
Themistius earlier reported that "the primary definitions are those forms 
that the intellect thinks by extraction from matter" (22,5 f.). Thus, the pri-
mary definitions are known from sense-perception and, presumably, un-
taught insofar as they cannot be demonstratively proven. 
I have a different suggestion founded upon Themistius's characterization 
of linguistic competency and scientific knowledge. Recall that he character-
izes concept mastery in terms of the ability "to group together (avv6YEIV) 
what is similar in dissimilar objects and what is the same in different things" 
(95,11 f.) and knowledge in terms of seeing "similar and dissimilar objects 
34 Because of the discrepancies between Alexander's De Anima and the Mantissa , it is 
not clear whether the latter is a genuine treatise or whether the connicts are a mani-
festation of it being either an earlier or later work with respect to the former. 
35 I take it that Themistius is here referring to the common and proper principles of a 
science. [n Posterior Analytics 1 10, Aristotle distinguishes between principles that are 
common to all sciences, such as the principle of non-contradiction and the proposi-
tion that equals removed from equals leaves equals. The proper principles are the defi -
nitions or axioms of the things with which a particu lar science is concerned. 
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and what [in th ose objects] is the same and different, and is implied and in 
con flict" (95, 17- 19). What is striking is his casting of these rational states in 
terms of our varying ability to discern similarity, sameness and difference. 
Themistius uses similar expressions to explain the acquisition of the first 
principles (or primary definitions) in hi s paraphrase of the Posterior Ana-
ly rics. There he reports that human beings "are able to un ite (crvvcmTEtv) 
simila r things and apply <the universal to them>" (63,13). He goes on to 
say th at this ability marks the difference between human beings and ani-
mals; for a ll animals have the connate capacity for sense-perception, the 
source of o ur knowledge, but we alone can grasp the first principles. We can 
"group together what is one among the many, what does not differ among 
the differing and what is the sa me in the different (TO EV EK TTOAAWV Kai TO 
6:5tc'x<popov EK 5ta<popwv Kai Ta\~JTOV E~ ETepwv crVVc'xYEt)" (64,10f.) .36 
This problem that Themistius raises - why it is that animals cannot dis-
cern the first principles - stems from the assumption that sense-perception 
genuinely supplies the foundation for our understanding. Thus, he makes 
much of Aristotle's claim that perception is, in some manner, of the univer-
sa L3? According to Themistius, we perceive essential characteristics. "When 
one sees Socrates, he at the same time sees in him what is similar to the 
other and what is shared" (64,6f.). St ill, Themistius is quick to note that 
there is a big difference between sense-perception and intellection. The 
sen es may perceive the universal, but it does so as commingled with matter 
and particularity (64,8 f.). The job of the intellect is " to separate, abstract 
and know the universal with respect to itself" (64,8). 
The theory so far is that the potential intellect acquires linguistic compet-
ency and scientific knowledge through its ability to organize and system-
atize the information it receives from the senses. Basically, we acquire the 
ability to apply universal terms correctly from the practice of grouping 
together and separating things appropriately, and later, come to know what 
binds the gro ups together a nd what distinguishes one group of things from 
a nother by studying and reflecting on the relevant objects that have been so 
arranged. My proposal , then, is that productive intellect gives to its poten-
tial counterpart the ability to assemble, arrange and organize one's experi-
ences and, therefore, gives to it the understanding of sameness and differ-
ence - the concepts necessary for the ordering of our sense-perceptions. 
These relational concepts are among the few that Themistius's productive 
intellect can think. Moreover, Sameness and Difference are two of the 
three ent ities that constitute Plato 's soul in the Timaeus. (Being is the third.) 
On the principle that like knows like, Sameness and Difference enable the 
soul to know the Forms, as well as the constituents of the sensible realm . 
36 Contrast this remark from hi s trea tise on the Poslerior Ana/ylies with lines 95, II f. in 
his paraphrase of the De Allima. 
17 eeAII.poSI.87b29and IOOaI 7. 
234 M y rn a Gabbe 
Thcmistius describes Plato 's theory in book onc of his paraphrase, and ex-
plains his intuition a follow: " When <thc oul> groups (avv6:YlJ) the gen-
era and species together, it traces out sa meness (-nlv ,-cx~1T6'-T)'-cx 6:VIXVEVEI), 
but when it grasps besides the differences ('-05 OICX<jl0POS TIpOaACXI-lI36:vlJ), 
it discovers difference ('-llV hEp6'-T)'-cx E~Evp(aKE I) " (11,8- 10). 38 Notable is 
the similarity of language by which he characterizes learning for both Aris-
totle and Plato. I have argued that Themistius doe not ascribe to Aristotle 
a Platonic kind of intellectual intuition or vi ion. However, he certainly ap-
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